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ALBERT E. UTITON* and PAUL D. McHUGH**

On an Institutional Arrangement
for Developing Oil and Gas in the
Gulf of Mexico
INTRODUCTION

Since the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, considerable attention has been
devoted to vast reservoirs of oil and gas discovered in the Gulf of Mexico.
During the past fifteen years technology advances and the need to increase
investment in petroleum exploration programs have led both the United
States and Mexico to significant new finds in the region.'
As recently as 1984 more than thirty new oil and gas field discoveries
were reported in the waters of the Gulf off the coast of the United States.2
Together with already existing fields, these discoveries bring estimates
of U.S. hydrocarbon resources to the range of from 1.3 to 8.3 billion
barrels of oil3 , and from 22.0 to 99.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.4
Although oil prices have plummeted in recent months, apparently diluting
the importance of these resources, many experts predict that demand will
again eventually outstrip supply.' That occasion will resurrect the interest
in energy resources close to home.
In 1980 U.S. geologists speculated that some regions off the Mexican
coast might have "more giant oil and gas fields than any area in the world
other than the Middle East, Western Siberia, the North Sea and the
Permian Basin." 6 They estimated that the areas with the most potential
for development in the Gulf might contain between 21 and 63 billion
barrels of oil, and between 12.3 and 52 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 7
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
**J.D., University of New Mexico, Member of the New Mexico State Bar, Judge Advocate, Pope
Air Force Base, North Carolina.
I. See Joyner, U.S.-Mexican Energy Relations in the 1980's:New Resources Versus Old Dilemmas,
12 CASE
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RES. J. INT'L L. 485 (1980), and Mexican Search Nets Significant New Finds, OIL AND.

GAS J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 94.
2.

ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAl

GAS, AND NATURAL GAS

LIQUIDS RESERVES: 1984 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter cited as 1984 ANNUAL REPORT], at 17.
3. Id. See also G. Dolton et al, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TH4EINTERIOR, ESTIMATES OF
UNDISCOVERED RECOVERABLE CONVENTIONAL RESOURCES OF OIL AND GAS IN THE UNITED STATES

(Geological Survey 860), table 4, at 22.
4. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 17, and G. Dolton, supra note 3, table 7, at 25.
5. Valencia & Miyoshi, Southeast Asian Seas: Joint Development ofHydrocarbons in Overlapping
Claim Areas, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 211, 212 (1986).
6. D. RONFELDT, R. NEHRING, & A. GANDARA, MEXICO'S PETROLEUM AND U.S. POLICY: IMPLI-

FOR THE 1980's 17 (A Rand Corporation/Department of Energy Study, 1980).
7. id. One author attributes the making of such significant discoveries to the effiency of Mexico's
government-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). See Joyner, Petroleos Mexicanos
in a Developing Society: The Political Economy of Mexico's National Oil Industry, 17 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63, 64 (1982).
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The wells in one area under Mexican jurisdiction, the Gulf of Campeche,
are considered to be some of the most prolific in the world.8
Notwithstanding the importance of the above resources to the energy
needs and the economies of the two nations concerned, even more important for the purpose of this article are the vast hydrocarbon resources
in the maritime boundary region in the Gulf of Mexico, because of the
impact their treatment might have on a developing area of international
law. This article will focus on that region, which encompasses an area
of the Gulf where jurisdiction over natural resources by the United States
and Mexico has not yet been established (see Figure 1). It will explore
international regulation of similar divided resources and examine what
provision might be made for the efficient, economical, and coordinated
exploitation of oil and gas fields which transcend international boundaries.
Finally, it will recommend what action the United States and Mexico
might take regarding future development of the resources in the maritime
boundary region.
United States Department of Interior geologists estimate that undiscovered, in place petroleum resources in the maritime boundary region
range from 2.24 to 21.99 billion barrels of oil, and from 5.48 to 44.40
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 9 Undiscovered resources are those not
yet found, but estimated to exist as a consequence of favorable geologic
conditions. In place refers to resources in place in the pore spaces of
reservoirs, "without qualification as to what part may be considered either
currently or potentially producible and without regard to any economic
or technological constraints." °
The scientists divided the boundary region into six assessment areas
on the basis of distinct geological characteristics: the Rio Grande Margin
area, the Sigsbee Escarpment area, the Perdido Foldbelt area, the Sigsbee
Knolls area, the Campeche Escarpment area, and the Abyssal Gulf area
(see Figure 2). " Although oil and gas are present throughout the region,
the areas which probably contain the most significant quantities are the
Perdido Foldbelt and Sigsbee Knolls areas. 2 All areas are in water depths
beyond current drilling and production technology. However, if technology advances as expected, experts anticipate that there will be operations
in the maritime boundary region. 3
8. Mexican Search Nets Significant New Finds, supra note 1, at 94-95.
9. Foote, Martin & Powers, Oil and Gas Potentialof the Maritime Boundary Region in the Gulf
of Mexico-3, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 119.
10. Foote, Martin & Powers, Oil and Gas Potentialof the MaritimeBoundary Region in the Gulf
of Mexico-2, OnL & GAS J., Dec. 27, 1982, at 224. See also Anyigbo & Haynes, Profitabilityof
Newly Discovered Gas in Gulf of Mexico, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 119.
11. Foote, Martin & Powers, Oil and Gas Potentialof the Maritime Boundary Region in the Gulf
of Mexico-], OnL & GAS J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 86.
12. Foote, Martin & Powers, supra note 9, at 120.
13. Id.

Fall 1986]

DEVELOPING OIL AND GAS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO

FIGURE 1. Map of the Gulf of Mexico Showing the Maritime Boundary Region. Source: Foote, Martin, and Powers, Oil and Gas Potential
of the Maritime Boundary Region in the Central Gulf of Mexico,
67 THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGIST
BULLETIN, No. 7, July, 1983.
STATUS OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY REGION

For centuries, the area which is the subject of this article would have
been considered a part of the high seas-that is, an area which nations
could not acquire or make subject to national sovereignty.' 4 In 1945,
President Truman proclaimed that the government of the United States
regarded the natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas, and contiguous to the coast of the
United States, as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control." The proclamation did not include objects within the
water column above the seabed itself. Nor did the United States attempt
14. See Goldie, InternationalLaw of the Sea-A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences, NAY. WAR C. REv. 43 (1972) and L. Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, in
USES OF THE SEAS 70-71 (Gullion ed. 1968).
15. Feldman & Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 729,
730-31 (1981).
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FIGURE 2. Map Showing Individual Resource Assessment Areas in the Gulf
of Mexico Maritime Boundary Region. Source: Foote, Martin,
and Powers, Oil and Gas Potential of the Maritime Boundary
Region in the Central Gulf of Mexico, 67 THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGIST BULLETIN, No. 7, July,
1983.

to delimit a maritime boundary with Mexico immediately following the
proclamation. 16 But between 1945 and 1972 the United States and Mexico
did enter into various agreements regarding regulation of fishing vessels
in the States' territorial waters. 17
In 1976 the Mexican government followed the example set by Chile
and Peru in 1948, and established an "exclusive economic zone" of 200
miles in which it claimed control of "all resources living and nonliving,
free floating and attached to the seabed, and under the ocean floor."' 8
Almost simultaneously, the United States Congress passed the Fishery
16. Schmitt, The Problem of Maritime Boundaries in U.S.-Mexican Relations, 22 NAT. RES. J.
139, 142 (1982).
17. Id. at 142-43.
18. Id. at 144.
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Conservation and Management Act of 1976, which went into effect on
March 1, 1977. Together with the Truman Proclamation, the Act effectively established a jurisdiction similar to an "exclusive economic zone.' 9
Both the United States and Mexico are signatories to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Convention provides that the
boundary between coastal States sharing the same shelf "is the median
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured," unless there are special agreements or special circumstances
that dictate otherwise."0 Therefore, if the maritime boundary region involved the continental shelf only, any delimitation would be governed
by the equidistance principle.
In the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the
Gulf of Maine Area, a Chamber of the International Court of Justice
enunciated the following prescription of general international law for
delimitation of not only the seabed and the subsoil, but also the overlying
water column:
(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States.
Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the
genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however,
such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected
by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application
of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of
ensuring with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and
other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.2
The United States and Mexico did, in fact, conduct good faith negotiations with the intention of delimiting a maritime boundary in the Gulf
of Mexico. President Carter submitted a resulting treaty to the Senate in
April 1979 for ratification.22 The Senate, however, refused to ratify the
treaty because of testimony indicating that the United States might receive
a smaller share of hydrocarbon resources as a result of the use of certain
islands off the Yucatan Peninsula as baselines for the boundary determination.23
19. Id. at 144-45.
20. Art. 6(l), Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 19, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 15 U.S.T.
472, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
21. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 ICJ
REP. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
22. Schmitt, supra note 16, at 147.
23. Sz~kely, A Commentary with the Mexican View on the Problem of Maritime Boundaries in
U.S.-Mexican Relations, 22 NAT. RES. J. 155, 157-58 (1982).
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The jurisdictional lines dividing the maritime boundary region in the
Gulf of Mexico remain undelineated. 24 But the time for the two countries
who share the region's resources to negotiate a policy for the development
of those resources is now-particularly since the two States can develop
a policy before the technology exists to exploit the resources without
cooperation. An examination of municipal laws and developing State
practices may suggest the most efficient manner of developing shared
resources.
THE NEED FOR UNITIZATION
Municipal Practice
Geologic structures containing gas and oil do not conform to property
lines, licensing demarcations, or political boundaries. Petrolific structures
containing oil and gas are characteristically porous formations surrounded
by an impermeable strata which traps the oil or gas in the porous formation. Salt domes frequently form the structural basis for entrapment.25
Since reservoirs are normally under heavy pressure, compressed oil and
gas escape when well drilling pierces the impermeable formation. The
contents of the reservoir then migrate to the point where the well is drilled,
draining the reservoir without regard to surface property lines.26 This
migratory feature of oil and gas has been a basic cause of disputes settled
by courts in domestic jurisdictions.7
In the formative period of oil and gas law in the United States, the
courts were without adequate understanding of the physical properties of
oil and gas and consequently used the law of capture by analogy to wild
animals. The courts held that oil and gas belonged to the owner of the
supra-adjacent land, so long as he controlled the oil or gas; but if it
escaped to an adjoining tract of land and that owner captured it and
possessed it, the former owner lost all right and title to it.28 The only
remedy of any owner was to drill first and recover the oil or gas before
his neighbor did. 29 In the absence of regulation, unrestricted races de24. Telephone interview with O.W. Girard, United States Department of The Interior (Nov. 29,
1985).
25. J. Haun & G. Lucas, Origin andAccumulation of Gas, NATURAL GAS, COAL, GROUND WATER
71 (Western Resources Conference 1966). Most of the following discussion of municipal unitization
practice is adapted from Professor Utton's previous writing in Utton, InstitutionalArrangements for
Developing North Sea Oil and Gas, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 66 (1968).
26. Williams, Compulsory Posting and Unitization of Oil & Gas Rights, 15 OIL & GAS INSTITUTE
223 (1964).
27. Kaveler, The Engineering Basis for and the Results from the Unit of Operation of Oilpools,
23 TUL. L. REV. 331 (1948).
28. See Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEx.
L. REV. 391 (1935); Meyers, The Necessity of Unitization-The Answer to Oil and Gas Conservation
7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 312 (1960); Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1218
(1938); Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L. J. 1206 (1947-48).
29. Jacobs, supra note 28, at 1207-08.
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veloped to exploit the resource reservoir. There was every incentive to
drill as many wells as quickly as possible in order to maximize the share
of the resource. Little or no regard was given to the economic development
of the reservoir as a whole. The result was chaotic waste-physical waste
of the resource, and economic waste caused by the pell mell drilling of
unnecessary wells. 3"
Well spacing legislation, designed to limit the number of wells that
could be drilled in a given area," was enacted to stop the drilling of
unnecessary wells.32 Too many wells reduced the pressure of the reservoir
and thereby reduced the recovery from the reservoir as a whole. Moreover,
significant economic waste resulted from loss of capital squandered in
drilling unnecessary wells.33
Once the number of wells was controlled, the next step was to regulate
the amount of oil or gas each well was allowed to produce. Proration
statutes established the production allowable per well in relation to market
demand. Uncontrolled production exceeded market demand, drove prices
down, and thereby caused some smaller unprofitable wells to be abandoned.34 In the early 1930s, for example, production of a million barrels
of oil each day in the East Texas oil field drove the price down to ten
cents per barrel. 35 In addition, excessive production meant oil or gas had
to be stored above ground, where it was subject to evaporation, leakage,
and fire.36 Compounding this physical waste, of course, was the economic
waste of having to build unnecessary storage facilities.
The establishment of drilling units through well spacing, and production
control by market demand statutes, were valuable steps toward the rational
use of the resource. However, still more difficult problems require unit
development of oil or gas fields underlying surface property lines or
political boundaries." The geological unity of the underground reservoir
and the fugacious nature of its contents dictate that both outputs and
inputs related to the reservoir as a whole must be carefully coordinated
in order to achieve the best use of the resource. 38 Well spacing legislation
reduces unnecessary drilling, but well placement is still governed by
30. Meyers, supra note 28, at 1.
31. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 5 (1968).
32. In some instances, even with the well spacing statutes, so many exceptions have been granted
as to diminish the effectiveness of the statute. Meyers, supra note 28, at 2.
33. Ely, supra note 28, at 1218-22.
34. C. MEYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 8-9 (1957).
35. Id.
36. Hazlett, Unitization of Oil and Gas Reservoirs: A Reply to Merril, 63 MICH. L. REV. 519,
524 (1965).
37. See id. See also EUGENE V. ROSTOW, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY (1948),
where the author states, at 45, that it is preferable "to impose unitary operations on the field, rather
than to undertake further experiments with the cumbersome, expensive and unsatisfactory plan of
prorationing."
38. See Kaveler, supra note 27, at 338-43.
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surface property boundaries which do not necessarily coincide with optimum geologic placement. Well placement based on the geology of the
reservoir, rather than surface political boundaries, can maximize primary
production. Depending upon the use of the natural pressure of the reservoir
to bring the oil or gas to the surface, primary production is seldom capable
of recovering more than fifteen to twenty-five percent of the oil in the
reservoir. By using secondary recovery or pressure maintenance methods
however, the recovery figures can be increased to eighty percent.39 Secondary recovery usually involves injecting of compressed gas or fluid
into the reservoir to increase or maintain the pressure.4" Newer, more
complex methods of enhanced recovery, known as tertiary recovery, include surfactant flooding, carbon dioxide flooding, steam injection, and
fire flooding.4 Efficiency and optimum use require the use of injection
and concomitant production operations on a reservoir-wide basis.
Most American jurisdictions view unitization as the best way to administer divided petrolific structures. Unitization is defined as "the joint
operation of all or some portion of a producing reservoir."42 The consensus
was aptly reflected two decades ago by an American Bar Association
statement:
It is only through unit operation that the logical and complete
application of present technical knowledge of oil and gas conservation can be accomplished. It is only through unit operation of a
common source of supply that individual property rights can be fully
protected. It is only through unit operation that the maximum recovery can be achieved and the maximum rate of daily production
maintained ."3
American experience with both voluntary and compulsory unitization
is extensive. Many states, as well as several Canadian provinces, have
compulsory unitization laws.44 And although there has been some considerable resistance to a compulsory unitization,45 the difficulties of voluntary unitization have led to adoption of compulsory unitization by more
and more oil and gas producing states.46
39. MEYERS, supra note 34, at 23-25.
40. Kaveler, Conservation in Production Through Unit Operation, On-FOR TODAY AND TOMORROw
46, 51 (1953). King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314
(1948).
41. Anderson, Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful Unit Operations, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 13-1, 13-5 n.6 (1984).
42. Id. at 13-3.
43. Quoted in MEYERS, supra note 34, at 12.
44. MEYERS, supra note 34, at 13; Whittier, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: Die-Hard
Kansas, 15 KANS. L. REV. 307, 311 (1967).
45. See MEYERS, supra note 34, at 13; Whittier, supra note 44, at 312; Comment, Compulsory
Unitization-the Answer to Oil and Gas Conservation 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 312, 319 (1960).
46. Voluntary unitization plans were frequently unsatisfactory because in some instances there
was need for agreement by 100 percent of all the owners in situations where there were many small
owners. The mechanical difficulties in locating the many and widely scattered owners caused costly
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In 1945 Oklahoma became the first major oil producing state to enact
compulsory unitization.4 7 By 1960, ten states had done so,48 and by 1984
the number had jumped to 32." Most statutes require that more than a
majority percentage of the owners agree to unit development. Mississippi
requires 85 percent and New York requires 60 percent, while most other
states have a 75 percent requirement.5 0
The typical procedure is for those interested owners to prepare a unit
development plan and submit it to the relevant state agency for adoption.
Hearings are held with all interested parties accorded an opportunity to
appear. If statutory requirements for conservation, development, and percentage of consenting owners are satisfied, the agency may order nonconsenting and consenting owners to participate in the plan. An operating
committee representing all owners, consenting and non-consenting alike,
delays, and the efforts were often abortive because the failure of one small land owner to agree
would block the entire attempt. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L. J. 1207,
1212 (1947-48). The minority, incompetency or unknown whereabouts of a single owner could block
agreement. To place such a premium on the agreement of a single owner often puts him in a
commanding bargaining position from which he might extract an inflated price for his agreement.
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE OIL AND GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 200

(1964). Even in those unusual unit agreements where unanimous consent was not required, those
who tried to proceed under the agreement ran into serious problems. The efficiency of pressure
maintenance operations depends upon placement of wells and control of levels of extraction and of
gas and liquid inputs. Without complete unitization the engineers may be inhibited in the placement
of the wells; and if input wells to maintain pressure are injecting water, gas, or air into the petrolific
structure, they will drive oil and gas on to neighboring property which may belong to a nonparticipant
in the unitization, thereby increasing his production at no cost to him. MEYERS, supra note 34, at
9. These and other shortcomings of voluntary unitization have led to compulsory unitization legislation. See MEYERS, supra note 34, at 7, for a discussion of these shortcomings.
47. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, sections 287.1-287.15 (1951), as amended, (Supp. 1966).
48. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 179(70) (1958); ALASKA. STAT. § 35.05.110 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§ 53-115 (Supp. 1965); CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 3315-3347 (West Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 377.28 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-717 (1957); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.5 (1951); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 522.170 (1961); WASH. REV. STAT. § 78.52.330 (1962).
49. ALA. CODE §9-17-13 (1980); ALASKA STAT. §31.05.110 (1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§27-531 to -540 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. §53-115 (1971 & Supp. 1983); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 3315-3347 and 3640-3659 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-118 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §377.28 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §43-706 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§5440-5453 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§55-1301
to -1315 (1983); KY REV. STAT. § 353.652 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (West 1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§319.351-.375 (West 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-3-7 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 259.120 (Vernon 1984); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-11-204 to-216 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 56-910 to -910.12 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 522.082-.0878 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-1 to -7-21 (1978); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 230901 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 38-08-09.1 to -09.17 (1980 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28 (Page 1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1 to .12 (West 1969); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 520.260 to .330 (1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-43-350 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§45-9-37 to
-51 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-202 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §40-6-7 (Supp. 1983); VT STAT.
ANN. tit. 29 § 525 (Supp. 1983; WASH. REV, CODE ANN. §§ 78.52.33052.460 (1962 & Supp. 1984);
W. VA. CODE § 22-4A-8 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-110 (1983). Cited in Anderson, supra note 40,
at 13-4 n.5.
50. See Utton, supra note 25, at 78 n.78. For a discussion of the ethical issues related to the
duty of fair dealing in pooling and unitization and the implied duty to pool or unitize, see also
Handlan & Sykes, Pooling and Unitization: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 19 TULSA L. J. 309
(1984).
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is then established. Finally, a unit operator is appointed, and costs and
revenues are allocated by formula to the various owners."
The municipal laws of most of the world's oil-producing nations have
developed in a manner similar to those of the United States. Today, a
majority of those nations have laws which specifically provide that:
when an oil-bearing structure is located in two or more tracts belonging to two or more different owners and thus the source of dispute
between them as to apportionment, the interested parties are obliged
to adopt a unitized plan of development under which competition is
now altogether eliminated and cooperation is required on coordias number and spacing of wells tapping the comnating such 5points
2
mon source.
Related InternationalPractice
Necessity and technology have combined to advance the discovery of
petroleum finds on various continental shelves throughout the world. Just
as with the resources within nations, the finds are migratory. Oil and
natural gas, like wildlife, ". . . move around as gravity, currents, [or]
pressure. . . moves them; grizzly bears don't stop at customs. "" In some
ways, international practice has paralleled that of individual nations in
dealing with the problems caused by nature of these resources.
The attitude that the "rule of capture" should govern the treatment of
natural resources was reflected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The Covenant, signed in 1967, provides that "all peoples may . . . freely dispose of their natural resources
without prejudice to any obligation arising out of international economic
cooperation. . . . "" An earlier United Nations resolution had already
identified the "inalienable right of a State freely to dispose of their natural
wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests." 55
At about the same time that these pronouncements were made by
representatives of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice
indicated that it recognized the problem arising from shared deposits of
natural resources. In its judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the Court said:
51. For a thorough discussion of how unitization for enhanced recovery is established for a field,
see Giles, "Putting Secondary Recovery Units Together," Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization 61(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn., 1980).
52. Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit, 17 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 85, 92 (1968).
53. Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don't Stop at Customs: A Preface to Transboundary Problems in
Natural Resources Law, 32 KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
54. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, UN. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in B. WESTON, R.
FALK & A. D'AMATO, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 196 (1980).
55. 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963), reprinted in B. WESTON, R.
FALK & A. D'AMATO, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 259 (1980).
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it frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the
line dividing a continental shelf between States, and since it is possible to exploit such deposit from either side, a problem immediately
arises on account of the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation
by one or the other of the States concerned.56
Nevertheless, writers continued to espouse a concept similar to the
"rule of capture." For example, some advocated that nations should
resolve the problem by applying what they called the "prior appropriation
rule." The rule gives the first country to undertake extraction the right
to exploit the entire deposit.57 Fortunately, no such rule of international
law has developed.
One scholar has suggested that a rule of international law exists which
would give neighboring States joint property rights to a common deposit
of hydrocarbon resources. Based upon his analysis of the practice of
nations, he concludes that no State may exploit the common deposit
without the consent of the neighbor who shares that deposit." In a comprehensive analysis of agreements between States which share resources
bisected by a political boundary, Rainer Lagoni59 indicates that there is
little legal foundation for the basic assumption that States have joint
property rights to the deposit."°
Lagoni views State practice as consisting primarily of bilateral agreements, which he divides into those which deal with common deposits
that might be discovered in the future, and those already discovered.6 1
He notes that one-half of the delimitation agreements concluded after
1942, and nearly all agreements on continental shelf areas since 1970,
include a mineral deposit clause calling for cooperation between the
contracting parties if common deposits are discovered in the future. 6 The
former category of bilateral agreements is most helpful to an analysis of
what course of action the United States and Mexico should take regarding
the oil and gas resources alreadly discovered in the maritime boundary
region of the Gulf of Mexico.63
56. [1969] ICJ REP 51, para. 97.
57. See Ely, supra note 28, at 1218 et seq.; H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 57 (1970).
58. Onorato, supra note 52, at 325.
59. Institute for International Law, University of Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany.
60. Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215, 221 (1979).
See also Goldie, Equity and the International Management of Transboundary Resources, .25 NAT.
RES. J. 665, 687-90 (1985), and Szdkely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary
Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experience for the Gulf of Mexico, in this

volume.
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id. at 233.
63. For a discussion of the factors influencing consideration of joint development of resources
in maritime boundary areas, see Valencia & Miyoshi, supra note 5, at 217. Some of the factors
which the authors review include: the relations and spirit of cooperation already existing between
the neighboring countries; their need for oil; geographical complications, such as islands in the area;
the incentive to avoid litigation of claims; and security considerations.
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According to Lagoni, four kinds of cooperation agreements exist in
State practice; the kind chosen depends upon the States' reasons for
cooperating in exploring and exploiting common deposits. The first, called
"geological cooperation," is typified by an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Austria dealing with a deposit of natural gas in the VysokaZwemdorf frontier area.' The purpose of the agreement is to ensure that
"each party receives a share of the total production in proportion to the
amount of reserves in its territory at the time the agreement was concluded." 65 A joint commission provides calculations to the parties to guide
their exploitation of the gas, and it sets waste-avoiding conditions for
both States. Through information exchange and consultation, Czechoslovakia and Austria cooperate to efficiently provide a product to consumers
in both countries.'
A second kind of cooperation agreement encourages concessionaires
of both parties to engage in joint operations. An example of such an
agreement is the Supplementary Agreement of 1962 to the Ems-Dollart67
Treaty between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The treaty sets procedures for development of the Ems River estuary,
which each country claims as its own. The parties reserved their legal
positions on the course of the international frontier, but agreed to a
preliminary dividing line. Concessionaires from each country must cooperate closely with their counterparts in the other so that each nation
receives an equal share of the petroleum and natural gas extracted. The
agreement also provides for dispute resolution for instances when the
concessionaires are unable to agree.68
Third, parties may agree to exercise joint power over an area's mineral
resources. Lagoni characterizes such an arrangement as "a functionally
limited condominium.", 69 Several Middle Eastern States have entered into
such agreements. In 1965 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait partitioned a strip of
land located between them at the Persian Gulf and called it the Neutral
Zone.7" There, the parties retain equal rights to all natural resources
recovered. The Ministers of Natural Resources of the two States grant
joint concessions for exploitation, based upon the recommendations of a
64. Agreement Concerning the Working of Common Deposits of Natural Gas and Petroleum,
Jan. 23, 1960, Czechoslovakia-Austria, art I, Jan. 23, 1960, 495 U.N.T.S. 134 (1964).
65. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 222.
66. Id.
67. Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty Concerning Arrangements for the Co-Operation in
the Ems Estuary (Ems-Dollart Treaty), April 8, 1960, Netherlands-Federal Republic of Germany,
509 U.N.T.S. 140.
68. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 222-23.
69. Id. at 226.
70. Agreement Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone, July 7, 1965, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia,
reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 1134 (1965).
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joint permanent commission. The agreement also calls upon the two
countries to cooperate fully to protect the rights to the shared resources. 7'
The Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign Rights over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi,72 signed in
1969, calls upon its signatories to equally share the al-Bunduq petroleum
field in the Persian Gulf. The parties exercise joint sovereign rights over
the field, and have agreed to consult periodically on all matters in order
to exercise their rights on an equal basis. They also equally share all
royalties, profits, and fees. 73
In 1974 Sudan and Saudi Arabia established a "Common Zone" in an
area of the Red Sea where semi-liquid metalliferous brines had been
discovered.74 Their agreement gives each country equal sovereign rights
to all of the natural resources in the Common Zone. Also, the parties are
to protect and defend their claimed rights against third parties. A joint
commission has the power to determine the method of exploitation of the
resources,
as well as to grant concessions and to supervise production
7
itself. 1
The final example of cooperation agreements perhaps most closely
approximates the current status of municipal legislation. These agreements provide for unitized exploitation of common deposits of hydrocarbon resources. An early paradigm is the 1974 treaty between Japan
and South Korea governing part of the continental shelf adjacent to both
of their coasts, the jurisdictional boundaries of which had not yet been
determined.76 The agreement established a Joint Development Zone, which
was in turn divided into several subzones. The concessionaires of both
Japan and South Korea enter into operating agreements which regulate
who shall operate each subzone, how expenses will be shared, and who
shall handle sole-risk operations. The agreements also provide for dispute
resolution.7 7 The concessionaires share equally in the resources exploited,
and in expenses. Jurisdiction in the Joint Development Zone is determined
as follows:
71. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 226-27.
72. Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign Rights Over Islands
Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, Mar. 20, 1969, reprinted in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 223 (Churchill etal. ed. 1977).
73. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 227.
74. Agreement Relating to the Joint Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Sea-Bed and
Sub-Soil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, May 16, 1974, Sudan-Saudi Arabia, United Nations
Legislative Series, National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.B/18 (1976), at 452.
75. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 227-38.
76. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf
Adjacent to the Two Countries, Feb. 5, 1974, Japan-Republic of Korea, reprinted in 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 117 (Churchill et al. ed. 1975).
77. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 224-25.
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(1) The share of a concessionaire of one party is regarded as
natural resources extracted from the continental shelf of that party;
(2) each subzone is governed by the laws and regulations of the
party whose authorized concessionaires are acting as operator; and
(3) neither party may impose taxes or other charges upon the
concessionaires of the other party.7"
A Joint Commission comprised of representatives of both nations reviews annual technical and financial reports from the concessionaires,
and the overall working of the agreement.79
During the same year France and Spain established a similar zone
speciale in the Gulf of Biscay. Unlike the agreement between Japan and
South Korea, this one also settled the question of sovereignty."8 Although
each party has sovereign rights over the resources on its side of the
dividing line, the agreement encourages concession applicants to conclude
accords of association with applicants nominated by the other party. The
accords thus established are then able to participate on an equal footing
in exploiting the resources in the special zone. The associations effectively
function as single unit operators in exploiting the area's oil and gas.'
Two years later Great Britain and Norway agreed that exploitation of
the Frigg Field reservoir of natural gas as a "single unit" would be the
most efficient manner to extract their shared deposits.8 2 Because the continental shelf demarcation is the controlling factor for apportioning the
in place reserves, they agreed that Norway should receive 60 percent and
Great Britain 40 percent of production, subject to reassessments made
necessary by changing conditions in the deposit. While the governments
themselves cooperate on numerous matters, the agreement calls for them
to require their licensees to appoint a unit operator for the deposit. The
agreement is implemented by a body established by the parties, the Frigg
Field Consultative Commission. It deals with many matters of concern
to both parties, such as "the influx of gas from other deposits, joint
conservation schemes, freedom of access to the installations, uniform
construction standards and safety inspections, taxation, and the laying of
a pipeline to the British coast." 83 Because of the detail the treaty provides,
Lagoni views it as a possible model for future agreements dealing with
common deposits of hydrocarbon resources in offshore areas. 84
78. Id. at 225.
79. Id.
80. Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves of the Two States in the Bay of
Biscay (Golfe de Gascogne/Golfo de Vizcaya), Jan. 29, 1974, France-Spain, 996 U.N.T.S. 345
(1976).
81. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 225.
82. Agreement Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the Transmission of
Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom, May 10, 1976, United Kingdom-Northern Ireland-Norway,
reprinted in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS INTHE LAW OF THE SEA 398 (Churchill et al. ed. 1977).
83. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 226.
84. Id. at 225-26.
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RECOMMENDATION

Although the history of United States and Mexican territorial relations
has often been characterized by hostility,8" the two States have usually
successfully negotiated to settle disputes as to jurisdiction over the resources of the seas.86 When President Carter submitted a treaty to the
Senate in 1979, ratification seemed certain. However, since 1981 when
the Senate postponed action to allow further study of objections raised
by U.S. geologists,87 the status of the treaty has remained unchanged.
Today's circumstances, on the other hand, dictate that the United States
develop a more comprehensive policy in its relations with its southern
neighbor, rather than dealing with problems on an ad hoc basis. 88
Although OPEC is no longer as cohesive and, therefore, not as influential as it was ten years ago,89 the need for countries to develop their
petroleum resources as efficiently as possible remains. Most oil-producing
nations have recognized that unitization is the best way to achieve maximum recovery." The trend in international practice is also in the direction
of cooperation. In fact, almost uniformly States include in delimitation
agreements cooperative provisions in case oil is later discovered. On that
basis Lagoni hypothesizes that, ". . . the practice of negotiating and
seeking agreement on the exploration and exploitation of a common
deposit and the apportionment of the minerals is not mere usage, but has
given rise to a customary rule of international law. 9'
Even though the United States and Mexico have not yet agreed to a
delimitation of the maritime boundary region, the existence of oil and
gas resources there is certain. Other agreements provide examples of
States which have agreed to cooperate in the exploitation of resources of
a zone where the political boundaries are still undetermined. 92 The United
States and Mexico need not "muddle through" to unitization. International
agencies which have existed for decades, particularly those administering
international water resources, 93 may provide models for the structure,
composition and procedures of a commission to administer the deposits
in the maritime boundary region. Now, the two countries may look to
municipal legislation and the agreement between Great Britain and Norway'
85. Szrkely, supra note 23, at 155.
86. Schmitt, supra note 16, at 140.
87. Id. at 149.
88. For a discussion of the concept that the United States should pursue relations with Mexico
within the framework of a "community" of nations, see D. RONFELDT, R. NEHRING & A. GANDARA,
supra note 6, at 94-97.
89. See Remember the Oil Noose? N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1985, at A16, col. 1, and Gasoline
Price Drop is Seen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at D9, col. 1.
90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
91. Lagoni, supra note 60, at 235.
92. See supra notes 68, 75, and 76 and accompanying text.
93. 747 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 979 (1967).
94. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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for working models of the mandate of authority to be given to a U.S.Mexican commission. Such a mandate might read as follows:
If at any time the Commission shall be satisfied that the strata in
the Treaty area or any part thereof contain part of a single mineral
deposit which extends beyond the boundary of the continental shelf
of one of contracting parties into the Special Zone as identified by
the treaty, and if the Commission shall consider that it is in the
interest of the contracting parties, in order to secure the maximum
recovery of the mineral and in order to avoid unnecessary competitive
exploitation, that the deposit should be worked and developed as a
unity in cooperation by all persons whose licenses extend to or include
any part thereof, then the following provisions of this clause shall
apply.
Upon being so required by notice in writing by the Commission,
the Licensee shall cooperate with such other persons as may be
specified in the said notice in the preparation of a scheme (hereinafter
referred to as "a development scheme") for the working and development of the deposit as a unit by the Licensee and the other
Licensees in cooperation, and shall, jointly with the other Licensees,
submit such scheme for the approval of the Commission.
The said notice shall also contain or refer to a description of the
area or areas in respect of which the Commission requires a development scheme to be submitted, and shall state the period within
which such scheme is to be submitted for approval by the Commission.
If a development scheme shall not be submitted to the Commission
within the period so stated or if a development scheme so submitted
shall not be approved by the Commission, the Commission may
prepare a development scheme which shall be fair and equitable to
the Licensee and other Licensees, and the Licensee shall perform
and observe all the terms and conditions thereof.95
As with many municipal plans, it is reasonable to allow licensees an
opportunity to agree voluntarily to unit development and to propose development plans; but the commission should have the power to disapprove
any plans submitted after adequate notice and opportunity for hearing has
been afforded all interested parties. Moreover, the agency should be
authorized to establish unit development on its own initiative, and to
administer unit development, once established. A commission with authority such as that provided in the above mandate would have the advantage of being able to develop experience and expertise so as to most
effectively develop the resources in the maritime boundary region of the
Gulf of Mexico.
95. Professor Utton proposed a similar mandate more than 15 years ago for a commission to
oversee exploitation of resources in the North Sea; see Utton, supra note 25, at 80-81.

